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Abstract
Compound interest as well as inflation grows exponentially with time, whereas other means to
repay debt grow polynomially. For this and other, mostly political, reasons, debt without inflation
is unsustainable. We suggest a discontinuous way to eliminate debt by nullifying it. This scenario
is preferable to current central bank strategies of quantitative easing because it allows the disposal
of debt without hyperinflation or bloated balance sheets.
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A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINABILITY OF DEBT
For economies with fractional reserve-generated fiat money [1], balancing the budget is
characterized by an exponential growth D(t) ≈ D0(1 + r)
t of any initial debt D0 subjected
to interest r as a function of time t due to the compound interest; a fact known since
antiquity [2]. At the same time, besides default, this increasing debt can only be reduced
by the following four, mostly linear, measures: (i) more income or revenue I (in the case
of sovereign debt: higher taxation or higher tax base); (ii) less spending S; (iii) increase
of borrowing L; (iv) acquisition of external resources A (e.g., through war [3], marriage,
or inheritance). (v) inflation; that is, devaluation of money [4, 5]. Whereas (i), (ii) and
(iv) without inflation are essentially measures contributing linearly (or polynomially) to the
acquisition or compensation of debt, inflation also grows exponentially with time t at some
(supposedly constant) rate f ≥ 1; that is, the value of an initial debt D0, without interest
(r = 0), in terms of the initial values, gets reduced to F (t) = D0/f
t. Conversely, the capacity
of an economy to compensate debt will increase with compound inflation: for instance, the
initial income or revenue I will, through adaptions, usually increase exponentially with time
in an inflationary regime by If t.
Because these are the only possibilities, we can consider such economies as closed systems
(with respect to money flows), characterized by the (continuity) equation
If t + S + L ≈ D0(1 + r)
t, or
L ≈ D0 (1 + r)
t
− If t − S.
(1)
Let us concentrate on sovereign debt and briefly discuss the fiscal, social and political
options. With regards to the five ways to compensate debt the following assumptions will
be made: First, in non-despotic forms of governments (e.g., representative democracies and
constitutional monarchies), increases of taxation, related to (i), as well as spending cuts,
related to (ii), are very unpopular, and can thus be enforced only in very limited, that is
polynomial, forms.
Second, the acquisition of external resources, related to (iv), are often blocked for various
obvious reasons; including military strategy limitations, and lack of opportunities. We shall
therefore disregard the acquisition of external resources entirely and set A = 0.
As a consequence, without inflation (i.e., for f = 1), the increase of debt
L ≈ D0(1 + r)
t
− I − S. (2)
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grows exponentially. This is only “felt” after trespassing a quasi-linear region for which, due
to a Taylor expansion around t = 0, D(t) = D0(1 + r)
t ≈ D0 +D0rt.
We conclude, that, under the political and social assumptions made, compound debt with-
out inflation is unsustainable. Furthermore, inflation, with all its inconvenient consequences
and (re-)appropriation, seems inevitable for the continuous existence of economies based on
fractional reserve generated fiat money; at least in the long run.
WHY RESERVE-GENERATED FIAT MONEY RULES
Before proceeding with another, discontinuous solution to issues related to compound
interest, let us shortly discuss and reject at least two “exotic” monetary scenarios that have
been proposed: First, consider a commodity-based monetary system, such as one based
on gold. Second, one may maintain fiat money, but consider its creation via interest-free
credit, thereby essentially eliminating interest rates r = 0 and thus also exponential growth
of compound interest, as 1t = 1.
One of the drawbacks of commodity based money is the limit to liquidity and expansion
of the volume of money it can provide (it could be suspected that rare commodities grow
linear or with low polynomiality), thereby seriously hampering such economies, and making
them less competitive than, and vulnerable to, other types of monetary schemes allowing
essentially unlimited expansion of credit.
Interest free monetary installments (which have a long tradition; cf. the Christian
usury [6, 7], and the Islamic riba [8]) are characterized by “infinitely cheap” seed money,
yielding to excessive borrowing and economic bubbles. As a result, the volume of money
must be severely restricted by measures and criteria which are highly questionable, and
mostly will not reflect supply-and-demand-sided market self-regulations. Also, it can be
expected that privilege or a certain arbitrariness and chance will govern the distribution
of such interest-free money; and therefore will result in questionable (re-)distribution of
resources.
In contradistinction, it is not totally unreasonable to speculate that the interest levied in
reserve-generated fiat monetary serves as a selection mechanism, thereby (re-)appropriating
economic resources and wealth through market mechanisms. We therefore suspect that the
current reserve-generated fiat money, besides its long-term unsustainability discussed earlier,
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is preferable over other forms of money.
APPROPRIATION OF WEALTH
The current crisis of mayor currencies, in particular the Euro, appears to demonstrate
that, in order to be intrinsically political, social and economic sustainable, every currency
zone formed by societies using one and the same money must also have the same economic,
social and economic framework, including equal taxation, and the capacity and will to
enforce taxation, as well as the same level of corruption. (We assume that it is not totally
unreasonable to suspect that corruption cannot be avoided, so it has to be accepted at some
levels.)
For instance, China, Germany or Austria seem to be a “rich countries with relative poor
people,” whereas Spain or Italy or France appear to be “poor countries with rich people.”
This may be due to a lot of factors, including the sorts and percentage of taxation or the
retirement system. Alas the resulting relative imbalances in sovereign debt may build up
to huge social tensions when it comes to “rescue packages” effectively transferring wealth
from those underprivileged who are heavily taxed to the privileged with low taxation. This
may cause tensions in both ways, because the underprivileged do not want to increase the
wealth of the privileged; and the privileged do not want to acknowledge their privilege, and
therefore demand to be rescued by the underprileged.
In Europe, mmbalances are further increased “accidentally” by an ill-conceived interbank
payment and clearance system for the real-time processing of cross-border transfers (TAR-
GET2) in the Euro-zone, which essentially presents the possibility of unlimited automatic
increase of inter-state loans and debts inside of the Euro-zone. Unlike in the US Federal
reserve system, this is not balanced regularly by the exchange of collaterals, but allowed
to grow unlimited. As a result, debt levels of quasi-insolvent states (with little access to
private borrowing) has increased dramatically, with little chance for the debtors (mainly the
German Bundesbank) to recover those quasi-loans (which, by the way, perform at very low
interest rates) through inverse transactions [9].
These factors – widely varying levels of taxation, social spending and corruption, as well
as an ill-conceived TARGET2-system – have contributed to a sort of “cargo culture” in the
“debtor nations,” which try to maintain and defend their consumption and spending levels
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“at all costs;” mostly through ceremonies such as the public demonstration of anger, and
through neglect. At the same time, the “debtor nations” demand to be rescued by their
“creditors.” The “creditors” become increasingly frustrated and unwilling to support this
“cargo culture” through unsustainable levels of debt and the TARGET2 system, combined
with high corruption and small tax rates of debtor nations. This is met with aggressive
popular outrage by their debtors. Both frustrations of debtors and creditors contribute to
potentially dangerous political tensions among nations.
As we will be dealing mainly with a proposal for a solution to the debt crises, we just
mention that, despite the urgent necessity to resolve the deficiencies of the Eurosystem
TARGE2 scheme, for any common monetary system to be sustainable a necessary criterion is
the harmonization and conformity of taxation, social as well as economic usances, including
levels of corruption and appropriation of wealth.
NULLIFICATION STRATEGY
In what follows we shall propose a discontinuous, and relatively “benign” way to reduce
debt levels without continuous inflation. Historically, unsustainable levels of debt have lead
to business cycles, which some believe are unavoidable and inevitable [10]. In contradistinc-
tion to these rather gloomy monetary frameworks, we will propose a very simple solution to
the debt crises, eliminating it by basically collecting sufficient portions of credit certificates
into a “bad bank” – which could be a portion of a central bank or any other institution
capable of fiat money creation – followed by a formal nullification (“haircut to zero”) of this
debt.
The proposed scheme involves three phases: (i) In the first, foundational phase, a “bad
bank” (BB) is formally created for the sole task to absorb “bad loans” and “unsustainable
debt levels.” This institution must have the capacity to create fiat money in return for credit
certificates, and not subjected to conventional rating proceduress. It might be preferable to
associate or adjoin such a bad bank with some international monetary institution, such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
(ii) In the second, acquisition phase, BB acquires credit certificates in return for newly
created fiat money by negotiating with markets; if possible by realizing a “haircut,” thereby
making it possible for endangered creditors (such as banks or funds) to get rid of their “bad
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loans.” The duration period of this phase is announced well in advanced, to allow all such
settlements to take place.
(iii) In the third, closing phase, BB is liquidated. Thereby the debt is either reduced to
sustainable levels or entirely nullified.
Let us discuss some arguments against such “haircuts.”
First, the scheme encourages unbounded creation of debt, as it amounts to the message:
“the more debt is created in return for consumption, the higher is the (re-)appropriation
of wealth toward the debtor.” This argument appears to be correct. Alas with respect
to (re-)appropriation the situation is limited by the regulations that can be imposed; and
throughout history there have already been very similar trade imbalances and inequalities
building up. Very seldom these trade imbalances could be settled without war or nullification
of debt. So, even the current regimes do not appear to resolve these issues.
Second, one may favor an apocalyptic (black Friday type) “crash scenario” motivated by
the clearing of suboptimal economic structures at the end of a business cycle. In such a
meltdown, all imbalances and debt-creditors are whipped out by a general liquidation of all
moneys, followed by a restructuring of the economy. Any such “Armageddon” appears to
be extremely risky and dangerous to the well-being of individuals and nations, as it bears
the potential for great political and social unrest and tragedy.
Third, it may not be imprudent to speculate that the liquidation of BB will not result
in overall inflation [11] – although certain segments of an economy might suffer from it – as
inflation and higher price fixes in markets occur through scarcity of goods combined with
a non-scarcity of money, resulting in subjective fears of price increases on the consumer’s
side. At present, there is no scarcity of goods in sight; even in the presence of diminishing
energy and other resources. Indeed, regularly nullifying debt in a controlled way presents a
good alternative to high inflation.
Fourth, imagine the benefit and potentiality of all nations starting with zero debt levels
again; as compared to having to fight the unfolding exponential expansion of compound
interest, a war that is provable impossible to win.
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COMPARISON WITH STRATEGY OF “QUANTITATIVE EASING”
Finally, one may argue that this is a direct realization of the printing press; thereby
allowing the “government and other debtors to acquire unlimited amounts of money.” In-
deed, any government, and politicians in general, might be tempted to go on an unlimited
spending spree without levying any taxes at all. This argument is essentially correct. In
order to avoid such behavior, restrictions to government spending and (easing) taxation
have to be installed. Alas, as has been argued earlier, for political, social and psychological
reasons, even in the current monetary regimes embedded in politics, any such attempts are
preliminary at best and will eventually fail.
Indeed, a very similar but “incomplete” approach – effectively realizing steps (i) and (ii)
but not (iii), – termed “quantitative easing” (QE) – is pursued by virtually all central banks.
For instance, on April 4th, 2013, the Bank of Japan unleashed [12] “a new phase of monetary
easing both in terms of quantity and quality.” In the United States of America a former
Chairman of the Federal Reserve declared that “we can always print [[more]] money.” And,
to present another anecdote, the Eurosystem has just granted Ireland relieve in pushing
repayments of about 40 billion e to an average maturity of over 34 years.
In that way, those central banks have already become BBs “for all practical purposes.”
Thereby, governments might hope to obtain compensation for the exponentially rising levels
of sovereign debt by payments of the (compound) interest the central banks receive from
the very bonds the government issued. Although such schemes are principally unbounded,
to some, say rating agencies or investors, the necessary exponentially (fiat) money volumes
created may eventually appear unsustainable at certain levels. Indeed it may eventually
dawn upon everybody that repayment of this debt in the exponential compound interest
regime will never be possible by economic growth, and is illusory without hyperinflation or
default.
We thus observe that this incomplete nullification of (sovereign) debt renders economies
increasingly volatile and vulnerable to the follies of the market. Because even with un-
bounded QE without nullification, there is a huge danger of carrying through exponential
schemes of compound interest, and thus of debt.
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